The tools of globalization. Ways of regulating and the structure of the international regime for pharmaceuticals by Demortain, David
The tools of globalization. Ways of regulating and the
structure of the international regime for pharmaceuticals
David Demortain
To cite this version:
David Demortain. The tools of globalization. Ways of regulating and the structure of the
international regime for pharmaceuticals. Review of International Political Economy, 2015, 22
(6), pp.1249-1275. <10.1080/09692290.2015.1066695>. <hal-01199694>
HAL Id: hal-01199694
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01199694
Submitted on 15 Sep 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
This article was downloaded by: [LSE Library Services]
On: 13 August 2015, At: 00:14
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London, SW1P 1WG
Click for updates
Review of International Political
Economy
Publication details, including instructions for authors
and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrip20
The tools of globalization: ways
of regulating and the structure
of the international regime for
pharmaceuticals
David Demortaina
a INRA, UMR 1326 Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire
Sciences Innovations Sociétés (LISIS), 77454 Marne-La-
Vallée, France
Published online: 28 Jul 2015.
To cite this article: David Demortain (2015): The tools of globalization: ways of
regulating and the structure of the international regime for pharmaceuticals, Review of
International Political Economy, DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2015.1066695
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2015.1066695
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the
information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.
However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or
suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed
in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the
views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should
not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,
claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities
whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection
with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.
Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-
licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s] 
at 
00
:14
 13
 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
The tools of globalization: ways of
regulating and the structure of the
international regime for pharmaceuticals
David Demortain
INRA, UMR 1326 Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire Sciences Innovations Societes
(LISIS), 77454 Marne-La-Vallee, France
ABSTRACT
This article investigates the relationship between regulatory globalization and
neoliberal standard-setting arrangements building on industry capacities and
responsibilities. Focusing on international pharmacovigilance, it recounts the
history of the World Health Organization programme for the international
drug monitoring, to shed light and explain the concomitant rise of the
International Conference on Harmonization and of its standards. It shows
that the neoliberalization of a regime or installation of a regulatory standard-
setting arrangement responsibilizing the industry is inseparable from the
emergence of an altogether different way of regulating pharmaceuticals
(including a different definition of the problem of pharmaceuticals safety, of
the organizations in charge of this problem and of the kinds of expertise and
information used to make decisions about it). This happens incrementally,
through gradual changes and hybridization of the existing regime, much
more than all-out replacement of the regime. The rise of a market-oriented
regulatory arrangement can therefore not be reduced to the influence of a
neoliberal scheme, but is on the contrary linked to the ways in which a tool
gains legitimacy as a way of tackling a global issue.
KEYWORDS
regulation; international regime; neo-liberalism; pharmaceuticals; WHO;
ICH.
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory globalization goes hand in hand with what some authors
have called ‘regulatory capitalism’ (Levi-Faur 2005; Braithwaite 2008) or
the greater involvement of private actors in regulatory arrangements.
 2015 Taylor & Francis
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Transnational regulatory schemes are effectively more and more fre-
quently inspired and run by private actors (Pattberg 2005; Vogel 2008;
Mattli and Woods 2009; Abbott and Snidal 2009), testifying to the influ-
ence of neoliberal policy scripts on international regulatory regimes
(Bartley 2007). This paper interrogates this relation between market-
enhancing regulatory arrangements and globalization, and more specifi-
cally investigates how these arrangements gain legitimacy to generalize
and inform international regimes?
The article approaches the regime for pharmaceuticals from the van-
tage point of the various ways of regulating that have prevailed over
time, to better understand the context in which new regulatory arrange-
ments based on greater industry responsibilization in the setting and
enforcement of standards gain legitimacy globally. The international con-
trol of pharmaceutical safety, and of post-marketing safety or pharmaco-
vigilance in particular, is an interesting case precisely because it evolved
towards greater use of the tool of regulatory standard-setting.
Drug safety monitoring or pharmacovigilance1 can be operated in two
ways. In a first sense, pharmacovigilance is based on systems of sponta-
neous notification: the systematic collection and analysis of reports sig-
nalling potential adverse effects, originating from physicians and other
health professionals prescribing or administering medicines. The devel-
opment of formal systems of spontaneous notification started first histori-
cally, and was international from the start. In the 1960s, several countries
launched programmes of collection and analysis of reports of suspected
adverse drug reactions in collaboration with the medical profession. The
World Health Organization (WHO) also created the ‘WHO programme
for international drug monitoring’ (the WHO programme hereafter) in
1968  still operated by a collaborating centre based in Sweden, the
Uppsala Monitoring Centre (UMC).2
The second method, ‘active pharmacovigilance’, makes use of post-
marketing safety studies, most often by the industry (also called post-
authorization studies or phase IV studies3). They are designed to analyse
the adverse effects that arise in a controlled population taking a given
medicine. Active pharmacovigilance is the form of drug monitoring
that has been most actively promoted in the past two decades, as testified
by the adoption and systematic application of European, American or
international guidance applying to such studies (Demortain 2008, 2011;
Davis and Abraham 2011). The guidelines are generally developed in the
International Conference on Harmonization of Technical Requirements
for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use (ICH). The ICH rou-
tinely produces guidelines, including for pharmacovigilance (Daemmrich
2004), according to an agreed upon procedure involving expert working
groups comprised of representatives of the US Food and Drug
2
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Administration, the European Union and the Japanese Health ministry,
industry groups, and other observers such as patient associations or the
WHO.4
In this paper, I show that inherent in the globalization of regulation is a
process of transformation of the actual way of regulating pharmaceuti-
cals. Over time, pharmaceuticals safety has come to be managed by nego-
tiating international standards to generate industry data, as much as or
more than by running public and professional systems of surveillance.
This is inseparable from a set of other changes that occurred in various
sites and scales, namely in the way the problem of pharmaceutical safety
is framed, in the conception of knowledge that is appropriate for regula-
tory control, as well as in the kind of public organizations shouldering
pharmaceutical control and their audiences. This leads to a three-fold
conclusion: the neoliberalization of a regime or installation of a regula-
tory standard-setting arrangement responsibilizing the industry, takes
place where and when this arrangement gains legitimacy as a tool and
way of handling an issue. This happens incrementally, through gradual
changes and hybridization of the existing regime, much more than all-
out replacement of the regime. While the presence of a neoliberal ideol-
ogy is certainly a contributing factor, neoliberalization is achieved when
actors that act within the regime  among others the industry  trans-
form its concrete policy workings.
In the remainder of the paper, I first review the literature and justify
the interest there is in analysing regimes as ways of regulating. I then
describe empirically the opposite trajectories of the WHO programme
and of the ICH, and the related shift in the approach of drug safety moni-
toring. The third section analyses these trajectories.
REGIMES AS WAYS OF REGULATING
From a global governance perspective, the globalization of pharmaceuti-
cal regulation is the result of two factors (Vogel 1998). The first is the
globalization of the political economy itself, embodied by the rise of spe-
cialized and highly internationalized pharmaceutical firms and the
increasing number of pharmaceutical products that are marketed world-
wide. The second factor, more political in nature, is the move of govern-
ments towards more international regulatory cooperation. This move, in
turn, has three explanations (Vogel 1998, p.18): the effort that European
countries have pursued, since the 1960s, to create more convergence
between national standards; the political pressures for more rapid drug
approval in both Europe and the United States; and the experience of
international cooperation itself in the very first meetings of the ICH.
Vogel’s analysis shows that the emergence of a global regulatory
regime correlates with the redefinition of state institutions as agents of
3
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transnational structures and markets, and the associated functional pres-
sures on states to contribute to the development of such structures. It
also underlines the role of the transnational industry in these develop-
ments, both independently and through lobbying of domestic institu-
tions. It illustrates the political negotiation of the values and goals
ascribed to the global regime by the various stakeholders, resulting in the
promotion of access to products as a new overarching goal. Overall, it
helps explaining the actual neoliberalization of the control of pharma-
ceuticals, that is the more effective application of industry preferences
for quicker access of drugs to the market and relaxation of standards,
owing to the capture of the international regulatory institution of the
ICH by the industry (Abraham and Reed 2001, 2002; Abraham 2004,
Abraham and Ballinger 2012).
The application of an international regime complexity perspective
(Raustialia and Victor 2004) would lead to a similar observation. The area
of pharmaceuticals control is very much a regime complex, since other
institutions and collectives than regulatory agencies and firms, the repre-
sentatives of which form the ICH, carry out the tasks of effectively con-
trolling the safety, quality and efficacy of pharmaceuticals, such as the
WHO. The launch of ICH and the production of more and more rules
within this forum appear to be a by-product of the growing regulatory
action of international firms, which shows in parallel agreements con-
cerning intellectual property such as TRIPS (Helfer 2004, 2009) but also
access to medicines for southern countries by the WHO or development
of medicines for neglected or orphan diseases. The literature on regime
complexes is interested in ‘array[s] of partially overlapping and non-hier-
archical institutions governing a particular issue-area’ (Raustialia and
Victor 2004). It looks at the institutional mechanisms such as strategies of
forum-shopping (Raustialia and Victor 2004, Busch 2007) and regime-
shifting (Helfer 2004) or orchestration (Biermann et al. 2009, Abbott and
Snidal 2009), that bear on the level of integration, coherence and overall
direction of a regime complex. This literature also shows that the policy
logic underpinning global regulatory dynamics is predominantly neo-lib-
eral. Research on climate, carbon capture, genetic resources, sustainabil-
ity or genetically modified organisms (Raustiala and Victor 2004, Bartley
2007; Kleinman and Kinchy 2007; Reid 2013; Zelli et al. 2013) all demon-
strate that regime complexes are overall informed by a neo-liberal logic.
They tend to align on the idea that a free market is more optimal than
pervasive public interventions, and result in the adoption of policy tools
that contribute fulfilling industry perspectives on product circulation
and market expansion. The generalization of this movement resonates
with what Ruggie calls the end of ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie 1998),
namely the fact that the world has undergone a broad epochal change
towards more neo-liberalism, observable in international policy affairs
4
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too. It illustrates a broader historical shift towards more market-oriented
regulatory policies at the global level, and the fact that international
regimes tend to reflect a different type of grand social compromise that
the one which prevailed until the 1980s (Bernstein and Pauly 2008)5.
One of the angles from which the intertwined logics of neoliberalization
and regulatory globalization have not been investigated, is a more basic
policy analysis one: international regimes or regulatory arrangements are
arguably legitimated by their putative effect on a given problem. Be they
private or not, it is because they have this legitimacy that they are accepted
and eventually institutionalized. Accordingly, one can then assume that
the fact that a regulatory arrangement partakes in the emergence of a
given way of regulating or acting on an international problem, is a condi-
tion that explains the fact that it constitutes the heart of a nascent interna-
tional regime.
One way of doing so is to modify what is understood by regime to
emphasize its policy dimension. For Krasner, a regime is a set ‘of implicit
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area’ (Krasner
1983). But regimes may include tools, practices and animating ideas about
how to tackle an issue, to further approximate what is considered a regime
by policy scholars (Elkin 1986; Hood et al. 2001). From this perspective, a
regime resembles what Gaudilliere and Hess call a ‘way of regulating’
(Gaudilliere 2009; Gaudilliere and Hess 2012). The way in which an issue
is collectively managed (and not regulated in the restrictive sense of set-
ting and enforcing standards) can be characterized in four dimensions.
The first is the value or aims of the policy (compliance, public health, com-
petitiveness…). The second is the tool of regulatory intervention. The type
of evidence that is used to define and legitimize regulatory measures (ani-
mal experiments, statistical human trials or epidemiological studies) is the
third component, the fourth being what Gaudilliere and Hess call the
‘social sphere’, that is the dominant actors or operators of the policy inter-
vention (corporations, professional societies, national public administra-
tions, non-governmental organizations…).
The strategy in the remainder of the paper is to tell the intertwined his-
tories of the WHO programme for international drug monitoring and of
the ICH, paying attention to the dimensions that are constitutive of a
way of regulating in Gaudilliere and Hess’s framework, as it helps cap-
turing the global policy context within which regulatory standard-set-
ting, as done in ICH, emerges as a legitimate tool. It thus appears that the
centralization of international activity on drug safety in ICH and the
globalization of regulation are inseparable from a set of other changes in
other dimensions of the regime. Not only has the main tool changed
towards a more explicit use of negotiated regulatory standard-setting in
an international forum. Tool change correlates with the attention given to
5
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the issue of quicker access to products (aim/value), but also with the
belief that the safety of medicines will be more objectively assessed
through industry data and studies (form of knowledge), and with the
emergence of public organizations that specialize in the setting and
enforcement of standards in a particular audience, which is the industry.
The data that is used to reach this conclusion come from two sources.
First, interviews were conducted with people in charge of drug safety
monitoring in regulatory agencies in Europe and in the US, as well as in
the European Commission, at the WHO and the UMC. About ten differ-
ent medical experts with a long history of participating in international
meetings on pharmacovigilance, at the WHO or in ICH, were also inter-
viewed. The data on firms came from interviews with two post-market-
ing safety officers working in large European firms, and from the
archives of the firm Geigy. The present study is not based on a full survey
of the engagement of firms with international pharmaceuticals control,
indeed a difficult research to conduct given accessibility issues. The
archival records of the WHO however allowed collecting precise histori-
cal information about how firms engaged with the WHO drug monitor-
ing programme. For this research, I explored the archives of the WHO
related to pharmacovigilance, drug safety and medicines policy more
generally, covering 1964 to 19886, providing great details about the activi-
ties and people of the UMC, of the WHO Pharmaceuticals Unit in
Geneva, as well as of other actors (pharmaceutical firms, national minis-
tries, hospitals) corresponding with those.
THE WHO AND THE ICH: OPPOSITE POLICY
TRAJECTORIES IN INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL
SAFETY CONTROL
The origins of international pharmacovigilance
The safety of medicines is regulated through two types of controls. On the
one hand, regulators review the safety of drugs as established through
pre-marketing toxicological and clinical testing by pharmaceutical compa-
nies, following laws and guidelines established by regulators. On the other
hand, post-marketing surveillance or pharmacovigilance serves to collect
data about adverse drug reactions and result in regulatory decisions, such
as revision of marketing authorizations and of labelling, or (much more
rarely) withdrawal.
The first attempt to organize drug safety monitoring at the interna-
tional level was based on the notification, collection and analysis of
reports of suspected adverse drug reactions by physicians. It originated
in the aftermath of the thalidomide disaster in the 1960s. The substance
thalidomide (commercial names Contergan, Grippex or Distaval)
6
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was developed by the German company Grunenthal, and massively mar-
keted across the world for all sorts of clinical indications. This product
was widely used, in quantities comparable to aspirin. Among other uses,
it was prescribed to pregnant mothers as a solution to morning sickness.
In 1961, Dr McBride, an Australian physician, reported in a medical pub-
lication an observed increase of 20% of phocomaelia (shortening of the
limbs) in newborns, correlated with the intake of thalidomide. This publi-
cation alerted other physicians across the world, notably Dr Lenz in Ger-
many. The convergence of observations by these two physicians led to
the confirmation that thalidomide was causing these malformations. This
discovery initiated a ‘policy tragedy’ (Carpenter 2010), and had a direct
impact on ongoing legislative discussions in the USA, towards the insti-
tution of mandatory pre-market safety and efficacy drug reviews. The
very way in which the epidemics was discovered (via concurrent medical
publications) inspired physicians with the idea that the systematic
exchange of observations by physicians and their centralization in a com-
mon database could result in quicker identification of adverse events and
ascertaining of causalities, even in cases of infrequent and dispersed
adverse events.
In 1962, the American Medical Association (AMA) tested a country-
wide reporting programme, based on the reporting of suspected adverse
drug reactions by hospitals. Five years later, the programme was made
official through an agreement between the FDA and the pharmaceutical
industry. In May of the same year, the World Health Assembly (the
assembly of representatives of WHO’s member states) adopted a resolu-
tion requesting a study of the means for rapid transmission of informa-
tion concerning adverse drug reactions to national health authorities. In
1963, the Assembly adopted a further resolution, requesting to take
action without delay to accelerate the dissemination of such information
among national health authorities, so that the latter may take rapid deci-
sions to restrict the use of or withdraw medicines with proven safety
problems. This resolution required the WHO to study the feasibility of a
collection of this information at an international level. It also invited the
member states to put in place national systems for the collection of
adverse drug information, similar to what the USA experimented. In the
UK, the ‘yellow card scheme’ (named after the yellow forms which
physicians across the country used to report their observations) was
launched in 1968 (Inman 1993). Similar systems were put in place in Aus-
tralia, Canada or Czechoslovakia.
The WHO took the decision to set up a pilot centre to develop and run a
monitoring programme in 1967. The centre made an operational start in
February 1968, with ten member countries (Australia, Canada, Czechoslo-
vakia, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, New Zealand,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States), represented by the professor
7
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of medicine (generally a pharmacologist) that headed the corresponding
national surveillance centre. During those years, the centre focused on
developing the various tools that were necessary to the functioning of the
central database. The first of these tools was a standardized form for
reporting of adverse drug reactions, to be used by national centres, for
data to be consistent and rapidly processed. The second working tool was
a dictionary of all known adverse drug reactions, classified by organ. This
terminology was supposed to help harmonize the description of effects
and reactions in the report, for easy retrieval and analysis in the database.
The dictionary will soon be known as WHO-ART (for Adverse Reaction
Terminology). In parallel, a third tool started to take shape: a drug dictio-
nary (now WHO Drug Dictionary). This dictionary was also instrumental
for a reliable analysis of adverse reactions, and more importantly for
imputation of these reactions to drugs7. Other tools were developed, such
as various algorithms to create a signal in the case of a rapid increase in
notifications concerning a given medicine, as well as various publications.
Even though the centre was only at an experimental stage, and strictly lim-
ited in its resources and thus in its early achievements, those tools  the
forms and dictionaries in particular  later proved instrumental for the
development of pharmacovigilance internationally, including by firms.
By 1969, the project was already deemed a success (Venulet and
Helling-Borda 2010). However, there were notable difficulties. The fund-
ing of the centre had become an issue, since the US government had
refused to fund it beyond 1968. Competent staff was also lacking. WHO
officials toured American hospitals, insisting with doctors and professors
that they direct potential applicants with relevant medical and statistical
expertise, only to be faced with the answer that no acceptable candidate
could be found.
The WHO found itself obliged to look for other funds to be able to
move to full functioning of the centre. Member countries were asked to
fund the programme themselves. To limit the costs of it, the WHO
decided to repatriate the centre within its headquarters in Geneva by the
end of 1970. During the period extending between the move of the centre
of Geneva and its relocation in Uppsala in 1978, more countries joined
the programme. (There were 20 member countries by the end of 1974,
that is after France and Japan joined.) The centre became better known
not for its analyses of drug reactions or major drug safety alerts but rather
for methodological developments in the science of ‘pharmacovigilance’,
then in its infancy. The centre benefited from an influx of drug safety
expertise from the transnational network of medical scientists and phar-
macology professors supporting it.
One difficulty came from the opposition of the pharmaceutical indus-
try. The pharmaceutical industry in general did not support the WHO
programme, and even fought against it. The firm Geigy actively worked
8
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against any temptation to give powers to the WHO to recall drugs based
on the data collected through its programme. According to this company,
the latter should remain a medical programme, aimed at improving the
use of therapeutic products, not one with regulatory impact.
Technically also, the hopes that the database could function as a sort of
automated detection device, thanks to its large statistical base and power-
ful IT instruments, gradually declined along the 1970s. The enthusiasm
around the principle of computer-aided statistical analysis of drug safety
data, as a way to prove the responsibility of drugs in causing an adverse
health event, and thus in motivating health authorities to authoritatively
recall drugs, slowly started to diminish. Even though the database kept
growing, the centre was only issuing a small number of interesting sig-
nals or alerts for national authorities. National health authorities also had
to complain, at times, about the ambition of the staff of the centre to pub-
lish papers in medical journals about key adverse drug reactions, using
confidential and proprietary safety data provided by national health
authorities and by pharmaceutical businesses. The officials in WHO
headquarters continuously complained about errors in the coding of
drugs and classification of reactions, of poor medical analysis, as well as
of poor printing quality of the documents distributed to national centres.
The WHO’s senior office for pharmaceuticals policy in Geneva also criti-
cized the lack of capacity for medical research, minimal competences of
the pharmacist and IT technician of the centre, as well as the membership
of its scientific advisory board.
Shifting agendas and WHO policy
From 1975 onwards, WHO officials in charge of the programme started to
express doubts about its value and the benefits for the WHO of support-
ing its development. The WHO soon stopped investing in its drug safety
policy. It delegated the running of the programme to the Swedish gov-
ernment in January 1978, when a ‘WHO collaborating centre’, funded by
the Swedish social and health affairs ministry, was created. The Uppsala
Monitoring Centre (UMC), as it came to be known, was to run the WHO
programme, with limited financial support (around 10,000 dollars to
cover printing and publication costs) but strong policy supervision from
the WHO headquarters  which retained most policy prerogatives, such
as the definition of the programme’s objectives, and management of rela-
tions with member countries.
The disinterest of policy managers at the WHO headquarters for drug
safety must be understood in the context of the rise of another agenda of
the WHO: that of the access to essential medicines. As Davies makes clear
(Davies 2010), the leadership and overall contribution to global health of
the WHO evolved through various phases. From WHO’s establishment
9
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in 1948 to the mid-1970s, the organization focused on developing massive
vertical programmes, building on critical technical-medical advance-
ments. As Halfan Malher became director general in 1973, these sectoral
programmes made space for a more horizontal and global strategy of
providing minimal health welfare to all populations around the world.
This strategic shift reflected in the declining interest for the medicines
safety programme, and the promotion of the essential medicines policy.
This was inaugurated by a resolution of the Assembly of 1975, calling for
the WHO to provide support to developing countries in the selection and
distribution of pharmaceutical products of sufficient quality, and at a rea-
sonable price. The first list of essential medicines was published in 1977.
The Alma Ata conference of 1978 established the access to essential medi-
cines as one of the 8 constitutive elements of a primary care system
(Laing et al. 2003)8. Sten Olsson, a pharmacist who has been with the
UMC since the early 1980s, observes that the WHO simply overlooked
the issue of drug safety after the signature of the memorandum with the
Swedish government in 1978: ‘Drug safety never was a priority in WHO
HQ, that always focused more on access to medicines and essential medi-
cines. […] WHO basically sold it out.’9 In retrospect, perhaps the most
perceptive and straightforward summary of events is that given by the
person in charge of pharmacovigilance policy at the European Commis-
sion in the 1990s: ‘In reality, there was a strong impetus after thalido-
mide, but it did not last.’10
One factor was instrumental in the evolution of WHO’s positioning
towards the problem of drug safety, and also explains the later rise of
ICH: the development of private, industrial pharmacovigilance. The
importance of this involvement of firms in regulation can be seen in a
policy memo that the senior policy officer and future chief of the pharma-
ceuticals unit at the WHO headquarters, John Dunne, sent to the director
general of the WHO in 1984. In this memo, written at the very moment
when the UMCwas gaining autonomy, Dunne informed his director gen-
eral of a strategic new development, which he called upon to give sup-
port to:
Conditions have changed radically since the scheme [the monitor-
ing programme] was introduced. Pharmaceutical manufacturers
are now widely required to assume responsibility for monitoring
their products as a precondition of marketing. They are also, in
some cases, required to apprise regulatory authorities on a timely
basis of all serious reactions attributed to their products wherever
they may have been reported. Thus, a large majority of reactions
now reported in the United States derive from manufacturers.
These changes, and the ascendancy of epidemiologically-based
approaches to drug monitoring, create a need to embark on a
10
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broader review of existing mechanisms and I attach, for informa-
tion, a project proposal that I am now developing in conjunction
with CIOMS.11
This letter sketched out a number of dramatic developments concern-
ing drug safety. The first is that drug safety was increasingly becoming a
regulatory domain in and of itself, and what is more a global one. In
effect, more and more countries were then contemplating to condition
the delivery of marketing authorization to obligations of monitoring of
adverse reactions occurring after marketing of the drug. This new rule
was a blow to the very design of the programme: given the likely increase
in reporting of information by manufacturers, the industry will gradually
become a more comprehensive source of data than physicians.
The second is that national authorities would most likely be in the posi-
tion to request pharmaco-epidemiological studies from manufacturers,
making spontaneous notification systems potentially redundant. In con-
trast with clinical trials, the number of people actually taking the drug is
not known, hence the proportion or frequency of the adverse drug reac-
tion out of the total number of prescriptions of the drugs cannot be com-
puted. Secondly, the adverse drug reaction is only in the first place an
adverse health event, which is not with certainty caused by the drug, but
possibly by a host of other factors on which no data is available in the
database. Missing information can be reconstituted if the data analyst
has medical, clinical experience, or a close contact with the practitioner
that observed the event. But this is generally an imperfect method, and in
any case it minimizes the efficiency of data mining as this knowledge
cannot be encoded. Last but not least, it is estimated that only 10% of
physicians actually notify the suspected adverse drug reactions they
observe (Leiper and Lawson 1985). When they do, they probably only
report a fraction of what they observe. All of the above are definitive lim-
its for the detection and action on adverse drug reactions through sponta-
neous notification systems, that have become increasingly obvious to
drug safety researchers as years passed (e.g. Barnett and Woods 1987;
Tubert et al. 1992).
The letter also boasts an initiative of the Council for the International
Organization of Medical Sciences (CIOMS). The CIOMS is a permanent
consensus conference of the medical profession, with close links to the
WHO (which hosts its meetings and publishes its proceedings) and the
UNESCO. It is the forum within which such international rules or char-
ters as the one that forbids the use of human subjects in medical experi-
ments were developed. A group of pharmaceutical companies chose this
venue for its projects to proactively develop international pharmacovigi-
lance standards12. These companies were reacting to the recent request
11
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by the FDA to report all information concerning serious adverse drug
reactions occurring worldwide, within 15 days. They knew all too well
that they did not have the tools to collect safety information in a stan-
dardized manner from across the world on all of their products. They
also anticipated that other regulators would emulate the FDA. At about
the same time, the heads of national pharmacovigilance systems in
Europe had indeed started to meet regularly within a ‘pharmacovigilance
working party’ under the aegis of the European Commission, exchanging
ideas about harmonized European rules in the matter.
The first CIOMS meeting on pharmacovigilance took place in 1984, and
was dedicated to the elaboration of a standardized form for the reporting
of suspected adverse drug reactions, and the establishment of a terminol-
ogy  similar to what had been undertaken as part of the WHO pro-
gramme. The second CIOMS session, extending over the second half of the
1980s, focussed on the development of a guideline for establishing periodic
safety update reports (PSUR): a report that collects and analyses all incidents
related to a given drug, at regular intervals (e.g. 5 years). The PSUR stan-
dard was integrated into EU law in 1993. It was also a prefiguration of the
future ‘risk management plans’, which the ICH formatted just a decade
later.13 That standard had a major impact on firms, by forcing them to put
in place resource intensive processes of collection and analysis of data,
infrastructures of traceability of products and uses, as well as dedicated
services. This standard contributed to a massive transfer of analytical work
from public agencies to firms. Since the WHO does not have the power to
request those data, the UMC does not collect them. Vigimed was thus
deprived from the most substantial sets of data on drug safety available.
The WHO did not and still does not have the legal power to regulate
the pharmaceutical industry, and was not seeking to obtain such powers
from member states at the time. The CIOMS project was thus advanta-
geous for the WHO: it allowed it to participate in transnational regula-
tory developments. Furthermore, the WHO could obtain from the
CIOMS the sort of results that the UMC had so far failed to offer: the
development of accepted and reliable technical standards for global
reporting of drug safety information. Importantly also, the industry
accepted to fund the series of CIOMS meetings, allowing this project to
run without the money of the WHO’s pressured core budget14. Overall,
this was an opportunity for the WHO to maintain minimal activity in the
area of drug safety, and to free resources to advance on the other policy
front of the access to essential medicines.
Towards global standards and operations
The establishment of a European regulatory regime for pharmaceuticals
further accentuated the opposite trajectories of the international
12
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monitoring programme and of the nascent regulatory work around inter-
national standards.
The process of Europeanization of national pharmaceuticals policies in
Europe accelerated in the second half of the 1980s, as part of the process
of creating the internal market. It is around this time that the European
Commission, led by Fernand Sauer for that matter, decisively shaped the
two-level system for the common licencing of medicines that was eventu-
ally adopted in 1993 (with a centralized procedure run by the European
Agency, and a decentralized procedure coordinated by member states).
According to Sauer’s vision, the integration of the regulation of medicines
at the European level was a necessity to evaluate increasingly complex
and globally distributed products. A European agency pooling the avail-
able national expertise would have far greater weight towards the increas-
ingly internationalized industry and the gold standard of pharmaceutical
regulation, the US Food and Drug Administration. This vision gained trac-
tability as European national administrations similarly engaged in the cre-
ation of agencies specialised in regulatory operations for pharmaceuticals,
such as the UK in 1989 or France in the early 1990s. These sorts of agencies
soon hosted and ran national systems of collection of adverse drug reac-
tion reports and databases. By competing and interacting among them-
selves, national regulatory agencies allowed the development of a
common European space for the regulation of pharmaceuticals (Hauray
2006; Hauray and Urfalino 2009).
One of the first concrete consequences of the Europeanization of phar-
maceutical regulation as regards pharmacovigilance and the WHO pro-
gramme is the development of a common European database of adverse
drug reactions, EudraVigilance. The setting up of Eudravigilance was
foreseen by the European regulations adopted in 1993 to create a Euro-
pean licencing system. More than a decade was necessary to make it fully
operational, with routine data transfer between national databases and
Eudravigilance. But it is now a more comprehensive than Vigimed, since
European Union member states, and thus companies that report to them,
contribute their data to it. In reality, it was developed in full awareness of
the fact that it would eventually duplicate and soon make Vigimed
redundant. For Sauer, the EU had no other choice but to build its own
database, in so far as the UMC was not technically capable of transmit-
ting back to the European Medicines Agency the reports that were sent
to it by the various member states of the programme, and that the data-
base was imperfect (duplications, gaps…). The issue of the collaboration
with the UMC and of the interconnection between Eudravigilance and
Vigimed was dealt with only after the Eudravigilance was fully up and
running. It was not until 2003 that an official of the European medicines
agency started to attend the annual meetings of the programme in
Geneva. The automated transmission of adverse drug reaction reports
13
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from Eudravigilance to Vigimed was only effective in 2015, nearly
20 years after the European medicines agency pledged it would fully
cooperate with the WHO on pharmacovigilance issues (EMEA 1998). The
EMA did make sure not to interfere in the relation between the UMC and
European countries that were part of the programme.15
Eventually, Eudravigilance has de facto replaced Vigimed for most
countries, including southern countries: they first consult the former
when they are in search of information on a product. Vigimed is a large
database, but 60% of its reports come from the USA, making it unrepre-
sentative and unfit for detecting signals. Also, the database only contains
data collected from professionals, who reportedly notify only about 10%
of the adverse drug effects they encounter in medical practice. This lack
of completeness and representativeness make it unlikely for this database
to generate robust and confirmed signals of adverse drug reactions,
which other databases would not spot.
A second concrete consequence of the rise of a Europe for pharmaceut-
icals is the acceleration of the ICH process itself. The Europeanization of
national regulatory activities was but one element of an on-going globali-
zation of pharmaceuticals control, to which Sauer thought Europe should
decisively contribute. He did put his weight in the launch of the ICH pro-
cess16. The ICH became a space for cooperation between regulatory agen-
cies, including on pharmacovigilance. Projects that overshadowed the
work of the UMC and of the WHO programme emerged there, notably
that of creating a common dictionary of regulatory terms.
In 1992, the UKmedicines agency took the initiative to propose to other
ICH countries to generalize the use of its own dictionary of medical
terms, MEDDRA (MEDical Dictionnary for Regulatory Affairs), without
considering how this initiative would effectively shut off all efforts to
develop and use the WHO terminology. This initiative shocked the UMC
and the experts associated to the programme, as it simply risked killing
the UMC: since the early 1980s, it had started to live off the money made
selling its dictionary and terminology to firms for their own internal use
and databases. The European Commission and other ICH participants
accepted the UK proposal, on the grounds that it was already operational
for the transmission of reports between the US and the UK. The European
Commission official in charge of pharmacovigilance issues, in retrospect,
minimizes the conflict that soared around this issue, but still recognizes
that hard battles were fought between institutions and dictionaries.
Even if MEDDRA is in part structured around the hierarchy of terms
designed by the experts of the UMC for the WHO-ART dictionary, it is
slowly evolving as a very different product. WHO-ART requires less
training in the use of dictionaries, because it uses more generic descrip-
tions of adverse drug reactions and fewer terms. MEDDRA is maintained
and distributed by a committee comprised of representatives of the
14
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industry and of regulatory agencies, under the aegis of ICH, something
which the people at the UMC call a technocratic approach, which con-
trasts with the inclusive approach of the UMC and WHO, towards devel-
oping countries specifically. WHO-ART itself has become less used, at
least by regulatory agencies of the North and by firms17.
There is thus a clear discrepancy between the WHO/UMC and what
developed through ICH. This was further compounded by the fact that
the WHO has only an observer status within the board of MEDDRA and
ICH18 and that it refused to take a leading position in the process. It did
not defend either the value of the tools developed by UMC, which may
have served as a working basis for new ICH standards. It reduced its role
to sensitizing this forum to the heavy requirements in technical, analyti-
cal and human resources that many of the rules that are being adopted in
ICH imply for developing countries. The UMC retains a particular
importance as provider of the WHO Drug Dictionary, of various com-
mercial services for data analysis, and also as centre of reference for
developing countries (providing training and infrastructure support for
the development of drug safety policies),19 but is broadly speaking
peripheral in the global regime for drug safety, which has turned much
more administrative and rule-oriented than it was when the WHO
launched its monitoring programme.
The adoption of a guideline for ‘pharmacovigilance planning’20 in ICH
was the second major incursion of the ICH in matters of pharmacovigi-
lance. The guideline was transposed in the EU and in the USA as a
requirement to firms to produce risk management plans (in the EU) or
risk minimization action plans (in the USA). This is the materialization of
the transnational expansion of an approach of drug safety in terms of
‘risk management’ (FDA 1999; EMEA 2005). Risk management emerged
at the US FDA as a new strategy to respond to the increase of drug with-
drawals in the 1990s  and to the pressure of firms and Congress to curb
it (Demortain 2008; Davis and Abraham 2011). It is based on two funda-
mental ideas. The first is that post-authorization safety management can
be improved by anticipating the safety problems that clinical trials sig-
nalled in the pre-marketing phase, or that they on the contrary failed to
document. Firms should be able to use this knowledge base to plan safety
management activities to implement in the post-authorization phase. The
second is that the continuous monitoring of safety problems should lead,
in case of actual problems, to retarget the use of the drug rather than to
withdraw them from the market. In short, risk management is pharmaco-
vigilance reinvented through the frame of marketing authorization:
based on data generated at this stage, and designed by firms and regula-
tory agencies, who have a concurrent interest in defending the credibility
of marketing authorization decisions (Carpenter 2010).
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Tellingly, the very drug safety researchers who contributed to develop
the concept of pharmacovigilance planning as a form of evidence-based
pharmacovigilance (Waller and Evans 2003) thought that the adoption of
this guideline was hasty and opportunistic (there was a consensus on the
idea, and the ICH was seeking topics on which to produce new standards).
The net benefits of generalizing such tool in the industry globally for saving
lives and reducing morbidity were not demonstrated. This complaint
reflects a broader feeling of hospital physicians involved in pharmacovigi-
lance in the pre-ICH era that the ICH now supersedes other forums, such as
learning or professional societies, in which drug safety methodologies were
validated scientifically andmedically, ahead of any form of codification.
GLOBALIZATION AND SHIFTING WAYS OF
REGULATING DRUGS
The current global regime for the control of pharmaceuticals is, as is clear
from the literature and also from the above history, centres on the activity
of the ICH and of its members  regulatory agencies and firms. It is
embodied by the high level of acceptance of the harmonized rules that
are adopted within this forum.
The global regime for pharmaceuticals is not without some complexity.
Although the WHO and the UMC have declined, they have not disap-
peared from the picture. They represent a sort of sub-regime, in the sense
that spontaneous notification is one mode of performing pharmacovigi-
lance, which itself is only one instrument of drug regulation. They fulfil
complementary or ‘support’ functions (development of the drug dictio-
nary, training in drug safety systems of southern countries), but are little
influential in drug withdrawal decisions and risk management.
There is also more interaction and cooperation between governments
and between firms through ICH where pharmaceutical safety is con-
cerned, than through the WHO programme. More decisions about prod-
ucts are made through ICH standards, than derived from the activities
and people of the WHO programme  despite initial ambitions to the
contrary. The globalization of rules for registration and post-marketing
surveillance is driven by regulatory agencies of the northern hemisphere
and multinational firms that develop product primarily for these mar-
kets. On the contrary, there is a form of discrete ‘global South’ network of
countries, the problems of which are considered through other forums,
such as the WHO and the UMC. The latter’s preference for the problems
of developing countries makes full sense only in the light of the retreat of
the WHO from issues of pharmacovigilance and from the ICH more gen-
erally, but also the voluntary shift of the UMC and the staff running the
WHO programme towards the promotion of drug safety policies in
southern countries.
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The picture of the global regime thus obtained is one in which there is a
clear hierarchy between actors, problems and tools for pharmaceutical
control. The ICH, associated regulatory agencies of the global North,
multinational companies, clearly took precedence over other actors like
the WHO. An approach in terms of ‘ways of regulating’ helps highlight-
ing the multiple dimensions of this shift, and its incremental nature.
The central shift in the above story is the fact that public organizations
have changed tool to control products. Besides running and organizing
systems of surveillance themselves, they now set standards for the indus-
try to perform surveillance and risk management. The decline of the
international monitoring of adverse reactions by means of spontaneous
notification is in part explained by the technical challenges facing the
WHO programme, but also the lack of political and financial support on
behalf of the WHO HQ. The context of this lack of support is the growing
investment in the tool of standard-setting for market authorization and
surveillance. From the 1950s onwards, internationally, more and more
governments have put in place precise formal requirements for data to
be presented before any use of the product by patients, resulting in the
emergence of a standard system of marketing authorization (Carpenter
2010). In the history above, this change materializes with the creation of
an EU licencing system. The rise of the tool of marketing authorization
also reflects in the activity and organization of major pharmaceutical
firms, most of which have developed massive R&D and regulatory affairs
departments to be able to interact with regulators during the generally
stringent process of evaluating of the toxicological and clinical data pro-
duced in support of their applications. From the 1970s onwards, firms
collectively invested in the development of rules for pre-marketing test-
ing of their products, and in lobbying regulators that were establishing
such norms.
What the history recounted above illustrates is that the use of the tool
of standard-setting gradually extended from the question of marketing
authorizations and preliminary tests to obtain this authorization, to the
issue of post-marketing safety. The result of this shift is a re-structuring
of the control of pharmaceuticals in terms of a divide between pre- and
post-marketing controls, which greatly redefined what surveillance or
monitoring of drug safety means. As marketing authorization assumes a
greater importance in national laws and guidelines, in the work of regu-
latory agencies and in the internal organization and resources of firms,
pharmacovigilance became the activity of checking out on marketing
decisions in the light of drug use data  or ‘risk management’. Given the
proprietary nature of the safety data, but also the difficulty for spontane-
ous notification systems to prove causal relations between an adverse
event and a drug, the preferred process evolved towards firm-controlled
epidemiological studies and risk management. Spontaneous notification
17
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systems were never conceived by the medical profession as an auxiliary
to the main mode of regulatory control, registration, but as a sui generis
system of professional learning and improvement in the use of therapeu-
tic products.
This shift in the preferred tool for controlling pharmaceuticals then
connects to several other evolutions, all of which contribute to explain
the launch of the ICH process and the establishment of global standards
for registration and post-marketing surveillance of products.
One of these evolutions is emphasized by Vogel (1998): it concerns the
aims and values underpinning the control of pharmaceuticals. The glob-
alization of regulation corresponds to an agenda of rapid international
access and approval of medicines. When approaching this dimension
from a historical perspective and from the outside as it were, that is from
the WHO’s view-point, one can see that the problem of the safety of med-
icines has waned to be associated to a notion of access to medicines
(essential ones as concerns countries in the South, innovative ones as con-
cern the North). Safety has become less of a problem of potential disasters
affecting the public and its health, and more of a technical criterion for
the evaluation and circulation of drugs. This is precisely the vision of the
problem of safety that is embedded into the rising tool of risk manage-
ment and pharmaco-epidemiological studies: safety as a condition
defined by pre-marketing tests and trials that must be validated or veri-
fied ex-post, through dedicated protocols.
The second dimension to which the shift in tools connects, which also
explains the globalization of control through ICH standards, is that of
knowledge and evidence. The story of the WHO programme and of the
UMC contains various indications that spontaneous notification systems
run by health professionals failed to produce globally accepted knowl-
edge about drugs and their adverse reactions. The failure of the pro-
gramme opened the possibility for a redirection of WHO’s agenda and
resources towards the CIOMS and later the ICH. It contributed to prove
that one tool (collection and analysis of safety reports by professionals)
could not be effectively organized internationally, and that other tools
should be preferred.
On the contrary, post-marketing safety being so critical for the preser-
vation of their markets, firms have engaged in the development of infra-
structures, competences and rules to run post-marketing safety studies,
or at least to collect data about their products in view of reporting them
to regulators. The CIOMS initiative and the industry’s purchasing of the
terminologies and dictionary developed by the UMC both exemplify
this. The result is that firms and regulatory agencies reached a level of
standardization of information and methods of interpretation that was
never achieved within the WHO programme, which supports the sort of
‘mechanical objectivity’ (Porter 1992)  that is, objectivity deriving from
18
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the application of agreed-upon rules and protocols, as opposed to objec-
tivity derived from professional expert judgment that is required to be
able to use safety data as evidence to take regulatory measures transna-
tionally. Quasi-experiments like pharmaco-epidemiological studies are
considered to have more reliability and objectivity to them than systems
of data collection, in which agents are notably more difficult to enrol.
With this epistemic change, the approach of the WHO, that conceived of
adverse drug reactions as epidemics, to be monitored and controlled by
professionals in the field, lost mileage.
The third factor of globalization to which a tool shift connects is what
Gaudilliere and Hess call the social sphere, or the actors that are deemed
legitimate to be in charge of the intervention.
As detailed above, the WHO minimized its involvement in the moni-
toring programme and drug safety agenda more generally. It did not
embrace, and did not become an actor in the new ground on which this
issue got dealt with, that of the international harmonization of require-
ments for the assessment of the benefits and risks of medicines. On the
other hand, the disaffection for spontaneous notification and the rise of a
more mechanical and standardized form of post-marketing surveillance
coheres with the ‘agencification’ movement in Europe, that is the creation
of more national regulatory agencies. Agencification means that national
administrations are established which, more than preceding ministries,
specialize in and depend on the existence of rules, are also faced with the
need to assert their authority towards the regulated entities. Again, tools
that produce regulatory evidence, better than what experience has shown
spontaneous notification systems to be able to do, are preferred by agen-
cies. The priority given, in the UK particularly, to the development of
rules for post-marketing safety studies exemplify this.
Another change at the level of actors, touched on above, is noticeable in
the kind of experts that populate transnational policy networks. The
WHO programme and the UMC have typically mobilized hospital physi-
cians, who systematically gave a central place to the therapeutic exercise
and the scientificization of their use of medicines. These experts have
increasingly felt disconnected from the world of ICH, which is populated
by physicians with dual competences and experiences in medicine and
science on the one hand, and with the development and application of
regulatory standards on the other hand.
The establishment of an international standard-setting process, with
greater weight to industry involvement and to a logic of harmonization
and relaxation of standards is, from a historical and multi-site perspec-
tive, inseparable from a complex set of changes. Whether we consider the
values and aims, evidence or personnel that prevail in the global control
of pharmaceuticals, regulatory standard-setting appears to be a tool that
coheres with the emergence of a new way of regulating, which is
19
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characterized by the consideration given to the objective of product circu-
lation and market functioning alongside (or concurrently with) that of
public health; the increasing weight given to standardized regulatory
knowledge (risk management) over professional knowledge and infor-
mation; the treatment of scientific and medical matters by regulatory
institutions and firms that mobilize health professionals who had previ-
ously established and run a knowledge system for their own professional
use and interest, independently from these organizations.
CONCLUSION
This paper analysed the historical transformations of an institution and
tool, the WHO programme for international drug monitoring, which pre-
ceded the current international regulatory regime for pharmaceutical
control. It did so to reveal factors of regulatory globalization and neoli-
beralization that one cannot discern when considering the regime syn-
chronically and synthetically, as an ideology or set of values reflected in
formal bodies of rules.
The paper shows that the globalization of pharmaceutical regulation
produced a regime of harmonization of registration and post-marketing
requirements by firms and regulatory agencies, because several other
evolutions occurred at the same time that contributed to install and legiti-
mize a new way of controlling drugs: one that proceeds through con-
trolled safety studies aimed at confirming marketing authorizations, that
operates under the assumption that such studies produce appropriate
knowledge to inform regulatory action, and that is driven by regulatory
agencies, firms and associated regulatory-scientific experts to maintain
the rapid access of the public to drugs.
Both of the ways of regulating that develop under the WHO and under
the ICH are transnational in their own sense, and prevail in different parts
of the world: the ICH and its standards for post-marketing safety matter
more in the North than in the South for instance, where WHO policies on
pharmaceuticals continue to play a great role. But in so far as the global
regime for pharmaceuticals regulation is embodied by the activities of the
ICH and associated regulatory agencies (the American, European and
Japanese ones), one may say that the administrative-industrial way of reg-
ulating drugs, and its specific tools, have globalized more effectively than
other ways of regulating drugs. One may say that one is the major regime,
the other a more minor one. The two are intertwined. The administrative-
industrial one emerged from and hybridized with the previous, profes-
sional one.
The case of pharmaceutical control is, like all case studies, too specific
to inform a general theory of regulatory globalization. However, it helps
highlighting a number of more general mechanisms that partake in and
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define the pattern of regulatory globalization that is observed. The paper
basically shows, first, that the rise of a new regulatory arrangement,
more neoliberal in its orientation, is the result of an endogenous transfor-
mation of regulatory regimes much more than an externally imposed
new regime based on a policy script that would be ‘foreign’ to the
domain in question.
A second finding is that neoliberalization is a process that takes place
in several sites of action, not simply in one. Ideological action is certainly
of importance, but in the present case, sites of concrete, technical stan-
dardization were key. The very fact that the industry effectively engi-
neered standards for international transmission of pharmacovigilance
reports did much to ensure that eventually, industry data and protocols
were used in pharmacovigilance. Importantly, no overall scheme gave
the direction and coordinated these changes. At times, visions of the
overall shift that was happening emerged, as the letter of Dunne to the
WHO Director General shows. But these rationalizations emerge from
within the process. They are punctuated, and nothing indicates that con-
flicting visions did not emerge in other places.
One final element of conclusion concerns the action of the industry to
manufacture these changes. Changes in the agenda (towards the problem
of access to medicines) or in the standards of regulatory knowledge
(towards more industry-based safety studies) are opportunistic transfor-
mations of the working of a regime by actors that have gained an under-
standing of how it functions and evolves. Actors of the internationalized
pharmaceutical industry were among those, and did act to transform it,
as the story presented above sporadically shows. This results concurs
with what the most recent work on regulatory capture describes (Carpen-
ter and Moss 2013): that policy outcomes are all the more concordant
with industry preferences as the industry acts in an ubiquitous manner
in various corners of the regime, ‘corroding’ the tools, sets of data and
information as well as organizations of regulatory intervention.
This means that neo-liberalization is all the more effective as the indus-
try (putatively the actor that most consistently promotes this sort of
change) engages to change the regime incrementally at various levels.
The changes described here being contingent and involuntary as much
as intentional, it results that it is not fully appropriate to link the rise of
neo-liberal, market-oriented arrangements, with the intended action or
lobbying of supposedly united industry actors. Neoliberalization goes
hand in hand with regulatory globalization in so far as the actors that
push market-oriented arrangements get involved in the workings of the
regime to modify it from within. However, market power is a key opera-
tor of regulatory globalization, in so far as those who own it use their
capacity to transform the workings of the regime. It is certainly relative
and contingent to the myriad factors that define these operations  and
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certainly creates a challenge for the students of those processes, given the
difficult and limited access to firms operations  but no less effective in
the long-run.
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NOTES
1. The WHO broadly defines pharmacovigilance as ‘The science and activity
concerning the detection, evaluation, analysis and prevention of adverse
drug effects or any other problem related to the taking of a medicine’ (WHO
2002).
2. The WHO programme helps countries in their pharmacovigilance activities,
but also centralizes all national safety data in a global database, to analyse
larger sets of data and make the detection of rare adverse drug reactions
more efficient  and the recall of unsafe drugs more effective.
3. In this that they follow the first three phases of testing that take place before
marketing of the drug. See Carpenter 2010 for details about the institutionali-
zation of this concept and practice of ‘phased trials’.
4. At its origins, the ICH is a common initiative of industry associations and
dominant regulatory agencies of the planet in the early 1990s to advance
towards harmonization of the requirements of those regulators for putting
drugs on the market. That process of standard-setting at the global level was
imagined at the turn of the 1980s-1990s, and took off immediately after an ini-
tial meeting in Brussels in 1991. Through regular, highly attended meetings,
the process gained momentum, and proved of great interest to all partici-
pants. While it was set to last only six years, it is still ongoing. It even
attracted more participants (Vogel 1998; Daemmrich 2004).
5. This observation of the neoliberalization of various international regimes
goes hand in hand with the analysis of the structure of power in the interna-
tional political economy. In short, the articulation and promotion of neolib-
eral arrangements is effectuated by the actors that are shown to drive and
influence the negotiation of international regimes or the dynamics of interna-
tional regimes complexes: powerful international organizations such as the
world bank or IMF for instance (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Broad 2006),
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sometimes associated with transnational policy networks (Goldman 2007);
transnational industry groups that capture and influence domestic or inter-
national regulatory institutions (e.g. Lall 2012); or, in a neo-gramscian per-
spective, a transnational capitalist class which redefines the interests of
national states (Harmes 2006; Eren-Vural 2007; G€org and Brand, 2000, 2006).
6. Jean-Paul Gaudilliere also kindly shared a couple of records from the
archives of the Swiss company Ciba-Geigy.
7. This dictionary is based on a unique identifier for each drug, the ‘medical
product ID’, which allows to make correspondence across various types of
classifications of drugs (by substance name, by proprietary name, by market-
ing authorization holder as well as by Anatomical-Therapeutic Classes). It
provides dosage, countries in which the product is marketed, and so on. It is
the dictionary of reference for regulators and for the pharmaceutical indus-
try, as well as for the now vast IT industry that helps the former building
internal product and distribution databases for its multiple products.
8. Fernand Sauer, who represented the French government in the WHA in the
1970s thus remembers that
Until the fall of the Berlin wall, the delegates of Eastern countries spent
a good deal of time during official sessions disparaging multinational
companies, and boasting the high quality of health care in their coun-
tries. Faced with multiple contradictory demands from member states,
the WHO then gave priority to essential medicines and traditional rem-
edies, and tended to consider that clinical trials and pharmacovigilance
were issues that were specific to richer countries.
(Interview with author, May 2012).
9. Interview with author, June 2012. Olsson is a pharmacist by background, and
a staff member of the UMC since its creation in 1978. He is now the chief officer
for the WHO monitoring programme, splitting his time between Uppsala
and Geneva.
10. European Commission official in charge of pharmacovigilance, interview
with author, February 2004.
11. Letter of John Dunne to WHO’s Director General, ‘WHO Collaborating Cen-
tre for International Drug Monitoring Uppsala  Sweden’, PHA/JFD/eor,
MIO/286/5, 7 August 1984.
12. Interestingly, the CIOMS project had been presented to John Dunne by Venu-
let, the former director of the WHOmonitoring programme. After leaving the
WHO in 1975, he joined the Swiss company Geigy, where he was in charge of
drug safety issues. That very company had been among the first to disap-
prove, back in 1964, the project of giving an international WHO centre the
power to take direct decisions to withdraw products following adverse drug
reaction reports. Through his contacts with Dunne, Venulet obtained the sup-
port of the WHO headquarters for the CIOMS project.
13. In fact, the CIOMS later became a preparatory forum for ICH work. Several
guidelines adopted by ICH were first conceptualized and sketched out
within CIOMS, sometimes by the same participants.
14. Starting in the 1980s, several key Member-states such as the USA or the UK
have started to provide money to the WHO through voluntary donations to
extra-budgetary programs, rather than through the biennal core fund. A
growing part of the overall budget of the WHO is thus directly attached to
policy programs (Davies 2010).
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15. It was agreed in 1998 that EU member-states would have to send ADR
reports to Vigimed as well as to Eudravigilance, but the UMC was requested
at the same time to export the reports of Vigimed towards EudraVigilance.
This rule was the object of a major conflict between the WHO and the Euro-
pean Commission.
16. According to Vogel, the EU has an interest in implementing global standards
on its territory, since EU member-states generally agree on these standards
in the first place. The EU is the area in which ICH guidelines are most directly
and frequently applied (Vogel 1998).
17. The generalization of MEDDRA in European countries and later in ICH
forced the UMC to modify WHO-ART, and to align many of its definitions
with those of MEDDRA. This was even more imperative after 2001 when the
US, the country from which the greatest part of Vigimed data originate,
decided to switch to MEDDRA. It is now possible to query Vigimed using
MEDDRA terms, which are more frequently updated than those of WHO-
ART, thanks to the working groups of the ‘maintenance organization’ that
the ICH set up for it. Since 2002, the UMC also aligned its dictionary with the
norms for identification of pharmaceutical products developed in the Euro-
pean Committee for Standardization. In 2005, the CIOMS working group 1A
and the ICH expert group ICH-E2b were put in place to standardize ‘data
sets for international exchange of adverse reaction information’. The UMC
has to comply with the guidelines that result from this work.
18. Ralph Edwards, who was director of the UMC at the time of the dictionary
battle, is also quite explicit about, and critical of, the strong desire to involve
the pharmaceutical industry in ICH, and the ensuing difficulties for southern
countries to appropriate tools and guidelines that are designed for countries
with high levels of expertise and resources (source: Interview with author,
October 2003).
19. The UMC employs 33 staff members for the development and distribution of
the drug dictionary, 11 for consulting activities, and 7 for the work around
the database.
20. That is, on the introduction within applications for the marketing authoriza-
tion of drugs, of plans for activities of pharmacovigilance to be conducted
after granting of the marketing authorization.
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